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INTRODUCTION
Areas of particular significance during the Survey period include
products liability and governmental immunity. In the area of prod-
ucts liability, the Michigan Supreme Court declined to determine
whether a manufacturer of birth control pills has a duty to warn
the ultimate user, stating that this determination is best left to
the legislature. The court's reluctance to rule in the area of products
liability for drugs sharply contrasted with its willingness to abolish
implied warranty as a theory of liability for design defects. In the
area of governmental immunity, the supreme court restructured
the governmental immunity doctrine to shield state and local gov-
ernmental agencies from tort liability, subject to narrow exceptions.
Given limitations of space and time, this Article will discuss
only those cases with an impact on black letter law. Cases con-
t Assistant Professor of Law, Wayne State University. B.A. 1972, Uni-
versity of Michigan; J.D. 1980, Wayne State University. Former Law Clerk to
the Honorable Horace W. Gilmore, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Michigan; Member of the Michigan Bar.-ED.
The author acknowledges the assistance of Susan L. Brown in the preparation
of this Article.
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cerning procedure, evidence, or pleading practices, as well as those
involving the Workers' Disability Compensation Act, are beyond
the scope of this Article.
I. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A products liability case involving a forklift truck allowed the
Michigan Supreme Court to make substantial changes in the com-
mon law.' In Prentis v. Yale Manufacturing Co., 2 plaintiff sustained
a hip injury while operating a stand-up forklift truck.3 Plaintiff
had difficulty starting the battery powered forklift on prior oc-
casions as the battery charge wore down. Power surges strong
enough to throw- a person off balance would occur once the forklift
started and previously had caused the forklift to break through
a garage door.4 Although plaintiff was aware that the battery
charge was low, he attempted to start the forklift while it was
on a slight incline. Plaintiff was working the operating handle up
and down when the forklift had a power surge, causing him to
lose his balance and fall to the ground.5 Plaintiff alleged negligence
and breach of implied warranty in the design of the forklift and
negligent failure to warn of dangers associated with its use. At
trial, plaintiff focused mainly upon his design defect claim. 6
The principal ground for plaintiff's appeal was the trial court's
failure to give separate jury instructions. The trial court had merged
the negligence and implied warranty claims and charged the jury
with a unified jury instruction requested by defendant. 7 The stand-
1. For an earlier case making substantial changes in the products area,
see Owens v. Allis-Chalmers, Corp., 414 Mich. 413, 326 N.W.2d 372 (1982).
Owens is a restatement of Michigan law rather than a new doctrinal development.
It was the supreme court's first attempt to specify the relationship between a
design defect claim and plaintiff's proof of an alternative design by requiring
that the alternative design be feasible and practicable.
2. 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176 (1985).
3. Id. at 676, 365 N.W.2d at 178. Powered industrial trucks can be
loosely divided into trucks designed to be controlled by a riding operator and
trucks designed to be controlled by a walking operator. See F.E. MCELROY,
ACCIDENT PREVENTION MANUAL FOR INDUSTRIAL OPERATIONS (8th ed. 1980). The
truck that Prentis used was of the latter classification.
4. 421 Mich. at 676, 365 N.W.2d at 178.
5. Id.
6. The thrust of defendant's design claim was that the forklift should
have included a seat or platform for the operator. Id. at 678, 365 N.W.2d at
179. This alternative design would have involved a substantial modification likely
affecting the forklift's utility. Curiously, plaintiff did not proffer a narrower
alternative such as a limit switch, which would have prevented the forklift from
operating when the battery drain reached a fixed level.
7. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
[Vol. 32:903
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ard implied warranty jury instruction requires that a jury determine
whether a product is fit for its intended or reasonably foreseeable
purposes." The trial court rejected the use of this instruction based
on the argument that the Michigan products liability statute9 merges
negligence and implied warranty theories of recovery.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision not to
administer the implied warranty standard jury instruction because
of established precedent requiring that standard jury instructions
be given whenever applicable. ' 0 The supreme court reversed, holding
that in a products liability action based upon allegations of defective
design, the jury need only be instructed on a single unified theory
of negligent design."
The supreme court's abandonment of the implied warranty
standard jury instruction, in use for more than a decade, is not
surprising. Several of its recent decisions foreshadowed Prentis.
I) Defendant's duties and liabilities as a manufacturer:
A manufacturer of a product made under a plan or design which
makes it dangerous for uses for which it is manufactured is . . . subject
to liability to others whom he should expect to use the product or to
be endangered by its probable use from physical harm caused by his
failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or
design.
A manufacturer has a duty to use reasonable care in designing his
product and guard it against a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of
injury and this may even include misuse which might reasonably be
anticipated.
2) Negligent conduct of both plaintiff and defendant: Now when
I use the word "negligence" with respect to the Defendant's conduct,
I mean the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person
would do or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person
would not do under the circumstances which you find existed in this
case. It is for you to decide what a reasonably careful person would
do or not do under the circumstances.
When I use the words "ordinary care," I mean the care a reasonably
careful person would use under the circumstances which you find existed
in this case. The law does not say what a reasonably careful person
would do or not do under such circumstances. That is for you to decide.
Now it was the duty of the plaintiff in connection with this oc-
currence to use reasonable care for his own safety, and it was the duty
of the Defendant in connection with this occurrence to use ordinary
care for the safety of Plaintiff.
Id. at 679-80, 365 N.W.2d at 180.
8. MICH. STAND JURY INSTR. 2D § 25.22 (1980).
9. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.2945-.2950 (West Supp. 1985).
10. Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 116 Mich. App. 466, 470, 323 N.W.2d 444,
446 (1982).
11. Although it endorsed a negligence instruction, the court did not premise
its decision on the products liability statute. 421 Mich. at 692, 365 N.W.2d at
186.
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For example, in Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 2 the court eliminated
the implied warranty jury charge in failure to warn cases, holding
that a reasonableness standard controlled. 3 Then, in Owens v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp.,'4 the court invoked a risk/utility balancing
approach in determining that plaintiff had not presented sufficient
proof to withstand defendant's directed verdict motion. 5 Since the
court adopted a negligence approach in design cases involving
failure to warn claims and a risk/utility balancing approach in
other design cases, its pronouncement in Prentis was predictable.
Despite increasing support for this approach in design defect lit-
igation, much of the court's reasoning is amenable to criticism.
The court gave numerous reasons for its decision to use a fault
system. These reasons included greater deterrence, cheaper insur-
ance rates for the careful, much needed protection against the risk
posed to a manufacturer's assets, avoidance of juror confusion
inherent in administering both a negligence and a warranty jury
charge, and a fair burden of proof for plaintiff because, unlike
manufacturing defects, design defects result from deliberate de-
cisions which are documentable and therefore discoverable. Much
of the data accumulated over the past decade, however, directly
contradicts or, at a minimum, fails to support the court's reasoning.
In regard to its incentive/deterrence contention, the court stated
that to the extent that products liability is intended to reduce the
likelihood of injury by encouraging the design of safe products:
"[A] negligence standard that would reward the careful manu-
facturer and penalize the careless is more likely to achieve that
purpose .... The incentive will result from the knowledge that
a distinction is made between those who are careful and those
who are not."' 16
12. 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d 476 (1979). In Smith, the court directly
addressed the relationship of negligence to an implied warranty jury instruction
for the first time. Justice Levin, in dissent, impliedly endorsed a "consumer
expectations" approach. Justice Levin's dissent in Smith must be read in con-
junction with his dissent in Prentis. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
13. 405 Mich. at 90-91, 273 N.W.2d at 480.
14. 414 Mich. 413, 326 N.W.2d 372 (1982).
15. In Owens, the court affirmed a directed verdict because plaintiff had
failed to present a prima facie case of negligence or a defect. Regarding plaintiff's
proposed alternative design, the court stated: "[W]e cannot take judicial notice
that their use by forklift drivers would be likely, practical, or more safe. Neither
the costs nor the effects of the other restraints were established." Id. at 431,
326 N.W.2d at 379. The court thus employed a risk/utility analysis in deciding
whether a prima facie case in negligence or implied warranty had been presented.
Id. at 432, 326 N.W.2d at 379.
16. 421 Mich. at 689-90, 365 N.W.2d at 379.
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The assumption that the reward for the careful designer is
reduced insurance premiums 7 is unsubstantiated. The most au-
thoritative federal agency report to date 8 found no correlation
between efforts by manufacturers to ensure safety and differences
in the cost of insurance coverage.' 9 Indeed, the report found that
the drastic across-the-board increases in premiums experienced in
the mid-1970s probably reflect an overreaction to increased product
liability claims and judgments. 20 The report stated:
Product liability insurance rates and premiums should be
monitored to ensure that they are fair, nondiscriminatory
and reasonably related to product risk.
Since insurance regulation is currently undertaken only at
a state level, it is essential that the state regulators have
access to a data base which includes nationwide experience
on all product liability claims. Regulators need such a data
base in order to evaluate rate requests effectively.
There is a need to promote greater financial disclosure and
accountability in product liability insurance.2'
Thus, there is not enough data at this time to articulate any
relationship between insurance rates and care in designing products.
The rates may vary as a result of product type, manufacturer size,
subjective insurer perception, and a myriad of other factors. It
is unlikely that the insurance industry, as a result of a negligence
standard, is able to determine which manufacturers are designing
safe products.
The Prentis court also focused on a principal difference between
manufacturing defect cases and design defect cases. In design defect
cases, a manufacturer's entire product line is at risk, thereby en-
dangering a greater portion of the manufacturer's assets and po-
tentially depriving the consumer of a needed product.22 Noting
17. Id.
18. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PROD. LiAB.,
FINAr REPORT 273-320 (1978), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
19. The report stated: "Thus we are unable to make any generalized
observation as to whether insurers provide that a manufacturer's product liability
premium will be diminished by the insured's application of a product liability
prevention plan." Id. at 178. Given past insurance company behavior in Michigan,
the insurers would likely retain the enhanced profits from reduced claims or
merely slow the rate of increase in premiums.
20. Id. at V-47-49.
21. Id. at V-49 (emphasis added).
22. 421 Mich. at 690, 365 N.W.2d at 185.
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these risks, the court required that plaintiff satisfy a higher thresh-
old of fault. 23 The court, however, failed to consider whether an
entire product line, and hence the assets of a manufacturer, ought
to be put at risk because of a defective design. As Justice Levin
stated in dissent, "To the extent that the argument incorporates
the result of a lower fault standard in terms of fewer successful
products liability actions, the argument begs the question whether
there should be a lower standard. 24
Moreover, in raising the risk posed to manufacturers' assets
as a criterion, the court may have presumed that too many man-
ufacturing enterprises have failed or been threatened with failure
because of the implied warranty approach in design defect cases.
The court's failure to state this point may result from the lack
of statistical support for such a conclusion. 25 Although the risk
to a manufacturer's assets is insurable, legal standards governing
manufacturer liability should not be determined by the availability
of insurance, but instead await evidence as to the scope of the
problem.
Juror confusion best supports the change adopted in Prentis.
In affirming the trial judge's refusal to instruct on breach of
warranty, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the in-
23. Id. The Prentis court adopted the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act, which applies a negligence or fault standard to design defect claims. The
court offered four reasons to support this application: (1) unlike manufacturing
defects, design defects result from deliberate decisions that are discoverable through
modern discovery rules; (2) a negligence standard for design defect claims will
reward the careful manufacturer and penalize the careless; (3) a higher threshold
of fault is required because a finding for plaintiff is equivalent to a determination
that the entire product line is defective; (4) a standard based on fault is intrinsically
fairer to manufacturers who are careful in their production and design. Id. at
689-90, 365 N.W.2d at 185.
24. Id. at 702 n.19, 365 N.W.2d at 191 n.19 (Levin, J., dissenting).
25.
Product Introduction and Discontinuation.
Product liability problems in the pharmaceutical and other high-
risk product lines may reinforce trends against new product development
with the result that some socially beneficial products may never be
developed or may be discontinued. This is especially true for smaller
firms. On the other hand, some of the products that are not produced
(or or discontinued) may be ones whose potential for causing harm
outweighs their social utility. This is an area that deserves further in-
vestigation.
Business Failures
Product liability problems do not appear to have been a direct and
sole cause of business failures.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PROD. LIAB., FINAL REPORT (1976) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT].
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struction "could have created juror confusion and prejudicial error.
Indeed, such an instruction would have been repetitive and un-
necessary and could have misled the jury into believing that plaintiff
could recover on the warranty count even if it found there was
no 'defect' in the design of the product." 2
The court's conclusion that juror confusion results from ad-
ministering both negligence and implied warranty instructions pre-
sents a dilemma. In actions involving a nonmanufacturer seller or
a claim of manufacturing defect, the implied warranty instruction
remains valid. Thus, the net effect of the court's decision is to
eliminate juror confusion in a narrow class of cases, while pro-
moting it in all cases involving nonmanufacturer sellers or man-
ufacturing defect claims. 27
The issue in Prentis was whether a jury can focus on man-
ufacturer design choices without necessarily adjudicating manu-
facturer or designer negligence. Justice Levin, contrary to the
majority, felt that a jury could.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Levin indicated that the issue
is not resolved simply by finding that some juror confusion may
result from separate instructions on manufacturer negligence and
product fitness.28 He found that resolution of this issue involved
questions ranging from insurance company rate-making practices
to profound questions concerning the quality of life in modern
industrial society. According to Justice Levin, these questions should
not be decided solely upon juror confusion. Nevertheless, Justice
Levin reached too far in urging a perpetuation of the "reasonable
fitness" standard. The former implied warranty instruction, which
asked the jury to determine if a products design was "reasonably
fit," required the jury to compare the safety of the design with
some external standard. The standard jury instruction, however,
did not supply this external standard. It left this important yardstick
to the proofs at trial and the closing arguments of counsel.
Absent some generally accepted standard or example of what
is reasonably fit, the concept of "reasonable fitness" is outside
the ken of the average attorney, let alone the average juror. Nothing
in our culture and experience provides common, universally ac-
cepted examples of "reasonable fitness." Thus, without additional
language focusing the jury solely upon the product at issue and
away from the issue of designer fault, the inquiry is reduced to
a consideration of fault. That inquiry is even more likely when
negligence claims are joined with implied warranty counts and
26. 421 Mich. at 691-92, 365 N.W.2d at 186.
27. Id. at 679, 692, 365 N.W.2d at 180, 186.
28. Id. at 697, 365 N.W.2d at 188 (Levin, J., dissenting).
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sophisticated defense counsel employ current strategies. Simply put,
the issue becomes whether the designer negligently made specific
design choices as measured by the factual circumstances of a plain-
tiff's accident and injury.
The former implied warranty instruction failed to focus juror
attention upon the alleged product flaw and away from consid-
erations of designer negligence. Nor did it focus upon designer
negligence. 29 Thus, individual jury verdicts might be explained by
the sophistication and tactics of trial counsel. Although that ex-
planation applies to most jury verdicts, it especially applies to the
former implied warranty instruction. Other jurisdictions have not
solved the problems associated with design defect claims. Some
jurisdictions, to avoid consideration of designer culpability, have
adopted a "consumer expectations" approach, asking whether the
performance of the product met ordinary consumer expectations.
This approach is not a panacea and appears no more advantageous
than the former Michigan standard of reasonable fitness.30
Neither the consumer expectations standard nor the reasonable
fitness test adequately captures the fundamental social policy ques-
tion underneath all products design claims. This question is whether
society desires that the product on trial be in a different form,
given the alternative designs available at the time of manufacture
and their feasibility, utility, and accident potential. Analytically,
whether an individual designer was negligent is not relevant to
this inquiry. Thus, the court's adoption of a negligence standard
represents a greater diversion from this core question than the
reasonable fitness and consumer expectations approaches.
Despite the foregoing discussion, the impact of the Prentis
court's adoption of a negligence standard on design defect claims
will be negligible for several reasons. First, Owens v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp.3 already requires quasi-negligence proofs in design cases.
29. The Michigan Supreme Court, in adopting the implied warranty theory
in products liability actions, rejected RESTATEMENT 2D § 402A and notions of
strict liability because the court feared that "strict liability" might be confused
with absolute liability or liability without fault. Thus, implied warranty jury
instruction has its genesis in the court's failure to clearly adopt either a strict
liability or negligence approach in design defect litigation.
30. See Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of
Defect, 10 Cum. L. REV. 293 (1979). Under a consumer expectations approach:
(I) A plaintiff could never recover for an open and obvious hazard; (2) Non-
defective products could be found defective; and (3) The premise "underlying
the test falsely assumes that the ordinary purchaser has definite expectations
about the dangerousness of the product." Id. at 302-03.
31. 414 Mich. 413, 326 N.W.2d 372 (1982). See supra notes 14-15 and
accompanying text.
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In addition, most astute plaintiffs' counsel will pursue design cases
as negligence actions given the nebulous nature of the reasonable
fitness standard and the benefit of proving that defendant is a
wrongdoer. As a result of Prentis, it is not clear what, if anything,
the consumer has lost; it is also not clear how the product reliability
and safety areas will be impacted.
The relationship between product liability litigation and specific
design decisions is tenuous. A recently completed study sponsored
by the Rand Institute For Civil Justice concluded that there is
little connection between the two. 32 This is a result of the long
time period between a specific design decision and the final ad-
judication of the product liability claim,3 3 the inconsistencies of
juries, and the rapid changes that occur in judicial doctrine in
this area.34
It is not evident what message Prentis sends to designers of
products. The instruction Prentis endorsed requires that a man-
ufacturer or designer merely behave reasonably with respect to
design decisions and does not require that the manufacturer or
designer be a design expert. A negligence instruction should be
added that would put designers on notice that the designs of
products placed in commerce must reflect significant investments
in technology and product safety.
Additional Michigan Supreme Court decisions in the products
liability area during the Survey period deserve discussion. In these
cases, 35 the court declined to decide when and under what cir-
cumstances the manufacturer of a prescription drug, used in a
nontherapeutic manner, owes a duty to warn the ultimate user of
the side effects and hazards posed by use of the drug.
In Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,36 plaintiff alleged
partial paralysis resulting from her use of an oral contraceptive.
32. G. EADS & P. REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS, CORPORATE RE-
SPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION vii-viii (Rand Institute for
Civil Justice, R-3022-ICJ (1983)).
33. Id. at vii (estimating a lapse of 5 or more years).
34. Id.
35. In re Certified Questions: Odgers v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.;
Grainger v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals, 419 Mich. 686, 358 N.W.2d 893 (1984).
Grainger and Odgers were filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan.
36. 419 Mich. 696, 358 N.W.2d 873 (1984). Odgers sought damages for
injuries resulting from plaintiff's nontherapeutic use of an oral contraceptive that
her physician prescribed. After the trial court granted defendants' motion for
a new trial on the ground of jury instruction error, the court certified the duty
to warn question to the Michigan Supreme Court. 609 F. Supp. 867, 868 (E.D.
Mich. 1985).
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In the companion case of Grainger v. Sandozf Pharmaceuticals,37
plaintiffs alleged that Mellaril, a drug commonly used in the treat-
ment of various affective disorders such as schizophrenia, caused
decedent's death. In declining to answer the certified question posed
by Odgers, the court, limited by the language in Smith v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc. ,38 stated that the dictum in Squibb did not
establish "whether a manufacturer's duty is to provide ... warn-
ings to the prescribing physician or directly to the patient." 9 The
court concluded that the legislature is better equipped to answer
a public policy question that involved marketing and economics
in a major industry.40 The dissent 4' recognized the need for a duty
to warn the ultimate user of oral contraceptives but not of other
prescription drugs. 42 This issue is not fully resolved and may soon
be reconsidered. 43
Thus far, a substantial majority of state courts adhere to the
"learned intermediary doctrine" and do not except oral contra-
ceptives. 44 Some recent decisions, however, support an exception
to this doctrine for mass-marketed prescription drugs that entail
minimal physician supervision, substantial consumer selection, and
nontherapeutic usage.41
In Michigan Mutual Insurance Co. v. Heatilator Fireplace,
4 6
the supreme court overturned the trial court's grant of summary
37. In Grainger, plaintiff sought damages for a heart attack allegedly
resulting from use of the therapeutic drug Mellaril. Plaintiff alleged that defendant
manufacturer had a duty to warn. The trial judge struck this allegation, but
then certified the duty to warn issue to the Michigan Supreme Court. 1d.
38. 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d 476 (1979).
39. 419 Mich. at 697, 358 N.W.2d at 877.
40. Id. at 691-92, 358 N.W.2d at 874.
41. Justice Boyle wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Williams and Justice Brickley.
42. 419 Mich. at 718, 358 N.W.2d at 887 (Boyle, J., dissenting).
43. Justice Riley did not take office until 1985 and took no part in the
opinion. Notably, at least one federal court has decided the issue, concluding
that the manufacturer has a duty to warn the consumer or user of birth control
pills. Recently, in Stephens v. G.D. Searle & Co., 602 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Mich.
1985), Judge Gilmore adopted the argument articulated by the Odgers dissent,
but stated:
The fact that a majority of the Supreme Court of Michigan declined
to decide this question does not prevent this Court from fulfilling its
responsibility to rule on the issue. It would have been much better if
a majority of the Supreme Court had answered what is essentially a
common law question. Such questions are universally addressed to courts.
Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
44. See Odgers, 419 Mich. at 704-05, 358 N.W.2d at 881.
45. E.g., MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 394 Mass. 131, 475
N.E.2d 65 (1985).
46. 422 Mich. 148, 366 N.W.2d 202 (1985).
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judgment, holding that there was a question of fact whether the
manufacturer had a duty to warn about the dangers of obstructing
the vents of a prefabricated sheet metal fireplace.47 The court noted
that this duty exists regardless of the purchaser's knowledge.4 8
In Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Dumon,49 the court found that
plaintiff should receive contribution for payments in excess of its
pro rata share of a judgment.5 0 The court held that the relevant
statute5' does not require that a claimant for contribution be a
joint tortfeasor 5 2
In White v. Chrysler Corp.,53 plaintiffs sustained injuries while
manufacturing component parts.5 4 The prime contractor provided
specifications that each component manufacturer of die was re-
quired to follow. The prime contractor retained title to the die.55
The supreme court applied the negligent entrustment theory, em-
phasizing that there was no actual entrustment of the die by the
prime contractors to their component parts suppliers.5 6
As a practical matter, White signals the end of negligent en-
trustment actions in an industrial context. In the future, automobile
and industrial manufacturers will routinely require that the com-
ponent part supplier provide the tooling necessary to complete the
contract.
This contractual nuance, however, is too artificial to support
the White decision since defendants in that case actually specified
the design of, and maintained title to, the die. The contract price
undoubtedly encompassed the cost of the die. By controlling the
design specifications and contract price, the prime contractor may
dictate whether the press die will use a system designed to prevent
injury arising from press operations. The court focused on limiting
the potential expansion of product manufacturer liability. 7
47. Id. at 153, 366 N.W.2d at 205.
48. Id. at 154, 366 N.W.2d at 205.
49. 421 Mich. 445, 364 N.W.2d 647 (1985).
50. Id. at 455, 364 N.W.2d at 654.
51. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2925(c) (West Supp. 1985).
52. 421 Mich. at 445, 364 N.W.2d at 653.
53. 421 Mich. 192, 364 N.W.2d 619 (1984).
54. Cf. Fredericks v. General Motors Corp., 411 Mich. 712, 311 N.W.2d
725 (1981).
55. 421 Mich. at 197-98, 364 N.W.2d at 621.
56. Id. at 201, 364 N.W.2d at 623. Unlike Fredericks, defendants in White
did not supply the die. Rather, the contracts required that the component part
manufacturer supply the die necessary for the production of the parts. Therefore,
it is arguable that a negligent entrustment claim under Fredericks is still viable.
57. The court indicated that imposing liability would transform the re-
sponsibility for job safety, putting it on the employer of the component parts
contractor. 421 Mich. at 204, 364 N.W.2d at 624.
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In White, plaintiff's attempt to impose job safety responsi-
bilities upon the prime contractor reflected a crisis in the work
place58 that the court acknowledged. 9 Thus, the court denied relief
because of the magnitude and scope of the problems of uncom-
pensated loss for industrial injuries. 60
In Przeradski v. Rexnord, Inc.,6 ' the court of appeals upheld
a jury instruction62 that precluded a finding of negligence absent
a latent defect or insufficient conformity with industrial or gov-
ernmental design standards. 63 The court concluded that the result
would not differ if it applied Owens retroactively. 64
The Przeradski majority ignored the supreme court's direct
rejection in Owens of the substance of this instruction as a mis-
statement of Michigan common law. 65 As the dissent noted, "[T]he
Court of Appeals decision in Owens put forward a new analysis
58. Data indicate that as much as 50076 of the total insurance payouts
involve workplace accidents and that approximately 30% of those payments
involved employer negligence. FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 41-45.
59. The court stated:
The larger problem of uncompensated loss for industrial injury or disease
remains unresolved, and a solution may be impeded, by allowing a finite
number of seriously injured workers to recover for loss not covered by
workers' compensation benefits. This social problem deserves a broader
solution than patchwork by this Court.
421 Mich. at 206, 364 N.W.2d at 625.
60. Id.
61. 136 Mich. App. 349, 356 N.W.2d 634 (1985).
62. The trial court relied on Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich.
App. 74, 268 N.W.2d 291 (1978), rev'd, 414 Mich. 413 (1982). The supreme
court subsequently reversed Owens, but released its opinion after the court of
appeals decided Przeradski. Przeradski was then remanded to the court of appeals
for reconsideration in light of the new supreme court decision. 417 Mich. 1100.19,
338 N.W.2d 188 (1983).
63. The jury instruction read:
When I use the word "negligence" with respect to the defendant's
conduct, you will find that I will be referring to negligent design. And
in that respect I mean, one, that the design claimed to be negligent
was not in conformity with industry design standards or design guidelines
established by an authoritative voluntary association; or two, the design
choice of the manufacturer carries with it a latent or hidden risk of
injury, and the manufacturer has not adequately communicated the
nature of that risk to potential users of the product. It is for you to
decide whether the design of the machine in this case was negligent
under such circumstances. But, that is the definition of the term, negligent
design, that I will be using subsequently.
136 Mich. App. at 362, 356 N.W.2d at 639 (Maher, J., dissenting).
64. The court stated, "Viewing the instructions as a whole, we doubt that
the differences engendered by the Supreme Court decision in Owens would cause
a different result." Id. at 361, 356 N.W.2d at 639.
65. Id. at 363, 356 N.W.2d at 640.
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for product liability litigation; prior decisions of the Court of
Appeals had followed the generally accepted theory eventually
adopted by the Supreme Court in its decision in Owens.
' 66
In Schmitzer v. Misener-Bennett67 and DeGraaf v. General
Motors Corp.6 8 the trial courts rejected evidence of seatbelt nonuse
in auto negligence and crashworthiness cases. After holding that
there was no common law duty to use ordinary care in buckling
seat belts, the court of appeals concluded that the legislature is
better equipped to decide whether motorists should be required
to use seat belts. 69
DeGraaf also addressed whether evidence of a lack of seat
belt use is admissible on the issue of proximate cause. The trial
court charged the jury that if plaintiff's failure to wear a seat
belt was the sole proximate cause of her enhanced injuries, the
jury should find for defendant. 70 Although nonuse as comparative
negligence is distinct from considerations of proximate cause, the
DeGraaf court correctly reasoned that the trial court's instruction
actually imposed a duty to use a seat belt. The court predicated
the decision, as in Schmitzer, on Romankewiz v. Black.'
In 1985, Michigan joined the few other states72 that have enacted
statutes requiring seat belt use. 73 The statute provides that failure
to use seat belts may be considered evidence of negligence and
may also reduce recovery for damages by not more than five
percent.74
II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
The Survey period contained several important decisions re-
garding governmental immunity.75 In Ross v. Consumers Power
66. Id.
67. 135 Mich. App. 350, 354 N.W.2d 336 (1984), leave to appeal denied,
422 Mich. 852 (1985).
68. 135 Mich. App. 141, 352 N.W.2d 719 (1984), leave to appeal denied,
422 Mich. 852 (1985).
69. Id. at 145, 352 N.W.2d at 721.
70. Id. at 142, 352 N.W.2d at 720.
71. 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969) (plaintiff's failure to use
seat belt not breach of duty).
72. See Note, The Seat Belt Defense: A Comprehensive Guide for the
Trial Lawyer and Suggested Approach for the Courts, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW.
272, 277-78 n.24 (1980); see also Casenote, Whether They Know It or Not,
Florida Motorists Must "Buckle Up" or Risk Loss of Full Recovery: Insurance
Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 669 (1984).
73. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.710e(1)-(8) (West 1985).
74. Id. § 257.710e(5).
75. Court of appeals decisions concerning governmental immunity have
been excluded from this Article. E.g., Sanford v. City of Detroit, 143 Mich.
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Co.,76 the Michigan Supreme Court attempted to clarify the doctrine
of governmental immunity. The result substantially restricts gov-
ernment liability in tort.
Ross fashions major changes in the governmental immunity
doctrine. 77 Ross continues the supreme court's practice of accu-
mulating a substantial number of cases and using them to pron-
ounce substantial departures from prior doctrine. 78 The Ross court
held:7
9
(a) that state and local governments are immune from
tort liability for governmental functions
(b) that governmental function is defined as "any ac-
tivity which is expressly or impliedly mandated or authorized
by constitution, statute, or other law;"
(c) that state and local governments may not be found
vicariously liable unless an employee, within the scope of
his employment, "commits a tort while engaged in an ac-
tivity which is non-governmental or proprietary, or which
falls within a statutory exception; '
(d) that judges, legislators and the highest level exec-
utives, when acting within the scope of their respective
capacities, are absolutely immune; and
App. 194 (1985) (plaintiff assaulted in abandoned building owned by city suf-
ficiently pled intentional nuisance to avoid governmental immunity) (application
for leave to appeal pending). Sanford is discussed later in this Article, however,
for its treatment of a premises liability issue. See infra notes 175-78 and ac-
companying text.
76. 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984).
77. The Michigan Supreme Court has used three different tests to determine
whether an act was a "governmental function." 1) An act for the "common
good of all" without a profit motive was considered a governmental function.
Gunther v. Cheboygan County Rd. Comm'n, 225 Mich. 619, 621, 196 N.W.
386, 387-88 (1923). 2) An act with no common analogy in the private sector
had the "essence of governing" and, therefore, was a governmental function.
Thomas v. Dep't of State Highways, 398 Mich. 1, 21, 247 N.W.2d 530, 538
(1976) (Kavanagh, C.J., and Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). 3) An activity whose
purpose, planning and creation could only be effectively accomplished by the
government also lay in the essence of government and, therefore, was a gov-
ernmental function. Parker v. Highland Park, 404 Mich. 183, 200, 273 N.W.2d
413, 419 (1978) (Moody, J., concurring) (municipally owned general hospital not
immune); Perry v. Kalamazoo State Hosp., 404 Mich. 205, 214, 273 N.W.2d
421, 424 (1978) (Moody, J., concurring) (public mental hospital immune).
78. The adoption of this method reflects either the difficulty in the ap-
plication of precedent or the change in the membership of the supreme court.
The death of Justice Moody is significant because he provided the swing vote
in both Parker and Perry.
79. Justice Levin dissented. Justice Kavanagh did not participate.
80. 420 Mich. at 591, 363 N.W.2d at 647.
81. Id. at 592, 363 N.W.2d at 647.
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(e) that lower level officers and employees enjoy a qual-
ified immunity, contingent upon their good faith and whether
the act was discretionary-decisional as opposed to minis-
terial-operational .8 2
The court's conclusion that state and local governments are
immune from tort liability for acts or commissions arising from
their performance of "governmental functions" is not novel. That
term has consistently limited the immunity that the applicable
statutory provision affords. 83 The court's definition of govern-
mental function as "any activity which is expressly or impliedly
mandated" by law is inconsistent with its prior formulations. 84
The breadth of this new definition cannot be overemphasized,
for it renders every act of state and local government immune
from tort liability unless a statutory exception, 5 contract theory,86
or nuisance theory87 provides for liability. Recognizing that its new
governmental immunity doctrine might not reflect a proper balance
of policy considerations, the court noted that its "definition may
be statutorily modified to reflect more accurately the desires and
needs of the public." ' 88
The Ross court found governmental immunity in eight of the
nine consolidated cases.8 9 These findings illustrate the many gov-
ernmental activities for which a constitutional, statutory or other
82. The court analyzed the evolution of the doctrine of governmental
immunity. While a complete discussion of the court's historical analysis is beyond
the scope of this Article, it should be noted that some of the court's conclusions
are questionable. For example, the court states that the legislature intended to
treat the state and lower governmental divisions uniformly. Id. at 614, 363 N.W.2d
at 658. Yet, as Justice Levin noted in his dissent, judicial construction, not
legislative action, transformed sovereign immunity into governmental immunity
applicable to both state and municipal governments. Id. at 671-72 n.23, 363
N.W.2d at 685-86 n.23.
83. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1407 (West Supp. 1985). The first
sentence of the statute expressly affords immunity only where a governmental
function is involved:
[A]II governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all
cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or dis-
charge of a governmental function .... this act shall not be construed
as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability
as it existed heretofore, which immunity is affirmed.
Id.
84. 420 Mich. at 591, 363 N.W.2d at 647.
85. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1402, .1405, .1406, .1413 (West 1968
& Supp. 1985).
86. See Rocco v. Department of Mental Health, 114 Mich. App. 124,
319 N.W.2d 674 (1979); infra note 89.
87. Rosario v. City of Lansing, 403 Mich. 124, 268 N.W.2d 230 (1978).
88. 420 Mich. at 620-21, 363 N.W.2d at 661.
89. In Ross v. Consumers Power Co., the court held a drainage district
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legal mandate can be implied or, if necessary, devised. 9° If the
constitution, a statute, or other law provides general authority for
an activity, and that activity furthers the general authority, then
the government is shielded from tort liability. The court has at-
tempted to avoid making judicial "value judgments" in cases in-
volving immunity.9' However, the Ross court's approach is premised
on the assumption that state and lower level units of government
will not err in making these judgments.
That the legislature intended to completely shield lower level
government from liability in tort is unsettled. Justice Levin noted
that the legislature did not intend to completely shield lower level
government. This interpretation would render unnecessary the lim-
itation on immunity for a governmental agency to activities related
to the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. 92
The legislature apparently adopted the governmental tort li-
ability act's assumption that the state and its agencies enjoy com-
plete sovereign immunity from tort liability. 93 If such immunity
had not been complete, the legislature would not have waived the
state's immunity for proprietary functions. 94 Furthermore, section
7 of the Act, which affirms the immunity of the state as it existed
under common law, becomes superfluous by the court's conclusion
to be immune on the basis of MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 280.1-.630 (West
1979). Id. at 637-38, 363 N.W.2d at 669. In Willis v. State, the court found
the state immune on the basis of the Social Welfare and the Youth Rehabilitation
Services Acts. Id. at 641, 363 N.W.2d at 671. In Siener v. State, the Mental
Health Code provided the basis for the state's immunity. Id. at 643, 363 N.W.2d
at 672. In Regulski v. Murphy, the School Code provided the basis for the
school district's immunity. Id. at 649-50, 363 N.W.2d at 675. In Trezzi v. City
of Detroit and Zavala v. Zinser, the Michigan Constitution, the city charter,
and MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 117.30) (West 1967) provided the basis for
immunity. Id. at 653-54, 363 N.W.2d at 677. In Disappearing Lakes Ass'n v.
State, the state was immune on the basis of the Michigan Constitution and MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 281.951-.965 (West 1979). Id. at 656-57, 363 N.W.2d at
678.
90. As Justice Levin stated, a governmental entity may "expand the scope
of its own immunity by promulgating an ordinance or other law relating to its
activities." 420 Mich. at 684, 363 N.W.2d at 692 (Levin, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 617, 363 N.W.2d at 660. One problem with the former inter-
pretation of "governmental function" was that it required extensive review by
both the supreme court and the court of appeals. The approach in Ross is likely
borne, at least in part, of the judicial frustration and the misallocation of judicial
resources the former definition of "governmental function" fostered. Id.
92. Id. at 664-70, 363 N.W.2d at 682-85 (Levin, J., dissenting).
93. See Cooperrider, The Court, The Legislature, and Governmental Tort
Liability in Michigan, 72 MICH. L. REV. 187, 277 (1973).
94. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 691.1413 (West Supp. 1985).
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that the first sentence of that statutory provision applies with equal
force to both the state and lower level government agencies. 95
Justice Levin, therefore, would provide complete immunity for
state government, subject to statutory exceptions, but define "gov-
ernmental function" to provide less than a complete shield for
lower level government agencies. 96 The chief obstacle to Justice
Levin's argument is the title of the Act, which indicates that the
legislature intended to make state and lower level governmental
agencies uniformly immune.
Both the majority and the dissent in Ross are persuasive. Be-
cause of competing statutory constructions of relatively equal weight,
governmental immunity requires legislative intervention.
A. Vicarious Liability
The court also precluded vicarious tort liability for govern-
mental agencies by incorporating the definition of "governmental
function" into the standard for vicarious liability. 97 Thus, if the
activity the governmental employee engaged in was in furtherance
of a "governmental function," the governmental agency is im-
mune.98
This approach to vicarious liability may signal the demise of
significant case law. 99 Prior to Ross, a trilogy of cases, Lockaby
95. 420 Mich. at 665-67, 363 N.W.2d at 682-83. The core of governmental
immunity in Michigan is embodied in MICH. Comn. LAws ANN. § 691.1407 (West
Supp. 1985). See supra note 6. The second portion of the provision unequivocally
affords the state immunity "as it existed heretofore." MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN.
§ 691.1407. If the legislature believed that the immunity afforded lower level
government was coextensive with that of the state, there would have been no
reason to include this language because the first sentence of the statute extends
immunity to all governmental agencies for conduct in the discharge of a "gov-
ernmental function." Thus, the court's conclusion that the legislature intended
the state and lower level governmental units be treated the same renders the
second sentence superfluous.
96. 420 Mich. at 663, 363 N.W.2d at 681.
97. Id. at 625, 363 N.W.2d at 663-64.
98. The court stated:
[I]f the activity in which the tortfeasor was engaged at the time the
tort was committed constituted the exercise or discharge of a govern-
mental function (i.e., the activity was expressly or impliedly mandated
or authorized by constitution, statute, or other law), the agency is immune
pursuant to § 7 of the governmental immunity act.
Id.
99. The court also cited with approval Hirych v. State Fair Comm'n, 376
Mich. 384, 136 N.W.2d 910 (1968), and Sherbutte v. City of Marine City, 374
Mich. 48, 130 N.W.2d 920 (1964). Sherbutte involved allegations of excessive
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v. Wayne County,1°° Galli v. Kirkeby,10 and McCann v. Michi-
gan,10 2 carved an exception to governmental immunity for inten-
tional torts. In Lockaby, the Michigan Supreme Court found that
allegations of an intentional tort by Wayne County avoided gov-
ernmental immunity. 0 3 Similarly, the court in Galli held that al-
legations of homosexual assault by a school principal were sufficient
to overcome a defense to governmental immunity.1°3 Finally, the
court in McCann reversed summary judgment in favor of the
government because plaintiff alleged an intentional tort. 05
Lockaby cannot be reconciled with the court's new approach
to governmental functions. Under Ross, if governmental employees
are engaged in activities that the constitution, statute, or other
law directly or impliedly mandates, the government is immune. °6
For example, the tortious conduct in Lockaby occurred during the
course of a statutorily mandated employment function. 0 7 Since
maintaining the county jail and controlling its residents is au-
thorized by law, a literal reading of Ross would shield the county
from liability for its employees' intentional torts. However, this
line of reasoning is suspect because the court did not expressly
overrule Lockaby, McCann, and Galli. Indeed, the court cited
those cases as examples of vicarious liability, without reference
to any limitation resulting from the court's new definition of
governmental function. Moreover, since none of the nine cases
before the court involved the intentional tort exception, trial courts
should not assume that Lockaby has no force.
force by a police officer while making an arrest. Construing 1951 Mich. Pub.
Acts No. 59, the court stated, "The political subdivision was not liable for the
tort of the police officer on the theory of respondeat superior, because the agency
doctrine related a tortious act to it, for which it could not be compelled to
respond because of its governmental immunity." 374 Mich. at 50, 130 N.W.2d
at 921. Hirych involved allegations of assault and battery, false arrest, malicious
prosecution and claims in assumpsit. In finding the City of Detroit immune,
the court stated: "As for the City of Detroit, its police activity was in the
exercise of a governmental function. Under Williams v. City of Detroit, 364
Mich. 231, governmental immunity exists, as to any such acts of a city prior
to September 22, 1961." 376 Mich. at 393, 136 N.W.2d at 913-14.
100. 406 Mich. 65, 276 N.W.2d 1 (1979).
101. 398 Mich. 527, 248 N.W.2d 149 (1976).
102. 398 Mich. 65, 247 N.W.2d 521 (1976).
103. 406 Mich. at 77, 276 N.W.2d at 5.
104. 398 Mich. at 537-38, 248 N.W.2d at 152-53.
105. 398 Mich. at 81, 247 N.W.2d at 525.
106. See supra notes 76-96 and accompanying text.
107. The state police arrested Lockaby and took him to the Wayne County
Jail, where he was evaluated as "mental." While in a cell for such inmates,
Lockaby knocked himself unconscious by hitting his head against the wall. The
injuries resulted in Lockaby becoming a quadriplegic. 406 Mich. at 74, 276
N.W.2d at 2.
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B. Individual Immunity
Prior to Ross, the supreme court had blurred the boundaries
of individual immunity, either by confusing it with notions of
governmental function'08 or by providing overbroad immunity
through an ultra vires approach." °9 The court's establishment of
absolute immunity for judges, legislators, and high level executive
officers comports with the decisions of numerous other jurisdic-
tions. 10 Although the meaning of "highest level executive officials"
remains unclear, cases from other jurisdictions help interpret this
standard.
Problems arise, however, regarding lower level governmental
employees and officials. According to the court, a qualified tort
immunity exists for these individuals with respect to the following
sections: "(1) acting during the course of their employment and
acting, or reasonably believe they are acting, within the scope of
their authority; (2) acting in good faith; and (3) performing dis-
cretionary, as opposed to ministerial acts.""' The key is distin-
guishing between discretionary and ministerial acts. Ross attempts
to clarify the issue by focusing upon whether the acts complained
of involve matters of "operation" or "decision." The court ex-
plained that "discretionary" denotes a decisional aspect and "min-
isterial" denotes an operational aspect." 2 The court's decisions in
three of the consolidated cases involving public officers or
employees' ' 3 illustrate the problems inherent in this approach.
In Willis v. Nienow,"14 the court held that decisions of a juvenile
care facility staff determining which children would participate in
a swimming outing, as well as staff hiring decisions, were "dis-
cretionary-decisional acts entitled to immunity.""' 5 In Regulski v.
Murphy,"16 the court held that offering a vocational class, allowing
108. See Bush v. Oscoda Area Schools, 405 Mich. 716, 275 N.W.2d 268
(1979).
109. See Lockaby, 406 Mich. 65, 276 N.W.2d 1. For a criticism of both
this case and Bush, see Ross, 420 Mich. at 629-32, 363 N.W.2d at 665-67. See
also Littlejohn & DeMars, Governmental Immunity After Parker and Perry: The
King Can Do Some Wrong, 1982 DET. C.L. Rnv. 1, 39-41.
110. 420 Mich. at 633-34, 363 N.W.2d at 667.
111. Id. at 633, 363 N.W.2d at 667-68.
112. Id. at 633-34, 363 N.W.2d at 667-68.
113. Of the nine cases consolidated in Ross, three specifically dealt with
public officers or employees. The court of appeals decisions appear as follows:
Zavala v. Zinser, 123 Mich. App. 352, 333 N.W.2d 278 (1983); Regulski v.
Murphy, 119 Mich. App. 418, 326 N.W.2d 528 (1982); Willis v. Nienow, 113
Mich. App. 30, 317 N.W.2d 273 (1982).
114. 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641 (1984).
115. Id. at 639-40, 363 N.W.2d at 670-71.
116. Id. at 567, 363 N.W.2d at 641.
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plaintiff to participate, or "deciding where and when to conduct
the class" were discretionary functions.' 17 However, the court stated
that instruction and supervision were ministerial. 118 The court also
distinguished the setting of safety policies within a school, which
is discretionary, from failing to comply with them, which is min-
isterial: "The actual provision of eye protective devices, first aid
supplies, and emergency transportation involves only ministerial-
operational acts. ' 119 In Zavala v. Zinser,120 the court held that a
police officer's determination of the appropriate response to un-
lawful conduct was discretionary, but the execution of the response
was ministerial. 121
The court's decisions in Regulski and Zavala vividly depict the
unworkable balance that the court struck in the area of individual
immunity. The distinction between decisional and operational acts
has neither eliminated the problem of judicial "value judgments"
nor brought clarity to the individual immunity doctrine. In effect,
the court has made the value judgment that decisions regarding
curriculum development and class size in schools and decisions to
use force during police intervention are of a different genus than
decisions regarding the supervision and teaching of a class or in
executing an arrest. This distinction is impracticable and requires
endless court interpretation of the semantic distinctions.
Except in the most obvious cases, 122 the discretionary-decisional/
ministerial-operational dichotomy does not help preserve the free-
dom of public servants to perform their job, unfettered by fear
of tort liability. The discretionary-ministerial distinction makes it
difficult for public employees to determine when and under what
117. Id. at 651, 363 N.W.2d at 675-76.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 651, 363 N.W.2d at 676.
120. 420 Mich. 567, 363 N.W.2d 641.
121. Id. at 659-60, 363 N.W.2d at 679-80. The court stated:
The determination of what type of action to take, e.g., make an im-
mediate arrest, pursue a suspect, issue a warning, await backup assistance,
etc., is a discretionary-decisional act entitled to immunity. Once that
decision has been made, however, the execution thereof must be per-
formed in a proper manner, e.g., the arrest must be made without
excessive force, the pursuit of the suspect must not be done negligently,
the request for assistance must include reasonably accurate information,
etc.
Id.
122. See Bandfield v. Wood, 421 Mich. 774, 364 N.W.2d 280(1985). Banfield
involved allegations of breach of government regulations regarding certain pro-
cedural requirements. Where there are specific regulations that obviously delimit
the exercise of discretion and a clear violation of it, the discretionary/ministerial
test may be applied with ease.
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circumstances they are likely to be immune from tort claims. As
a result, courts must decide individual tort immunity on a case-
by-case basis.
Unlike governmental immunity, individual immunity is neither
directed nor limited by legislative command.'12 It is curious that
the court has adopted a standard which invites litigation. Perhaps
the court attempted to mitigate the harshness of the "governmental
function" definition by ensuring that injured plaintiffs will be able
to maintain negligence actions against employees who are not en-
gaged in discretionary activity. If so, Ross inappropriately inverts
the liability chain by making individual employees the most likely
litigation targets for injured plaintiffs. Thus, whether to defend
a tort action or to compensate an injury is now largely a matter
of governmental discretion. Although Ross has been widely crit-
icized, the regressive nature of Michigan's Governmental Immunity
Act' 24 must be kept in mind. The Act is out of step with the
modern view of governmental immunity. 25 Thus, the options avail-
able to the court in Ross were limited. A legislative reformulation
of the immunity doctrine is the only effective way to accomplish
significant change in this area.
The supreme court also decided several immunity cases in-
volving apparent statutory conflicts. In Bakun v. Sanilac County
Road Commission,'26 the court held that defendant road com-
mission could be held liable for the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle pursuant to the governmental immunity statute. 27 The court
reached this conclusion despite statutory language that places li-
ability for construction and maintenance of trunk line highways
solely on the state. 12
In Sziber v. Stout,129 the supreme court considered whether
the statutory exception to governmental immunity for defective
123. 420 Mich. at 628-29, 363 N.W.2d at 665.
124. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1401-.1415 (West 1968 & Supp. 1985).
125. The current trend is toward the abrogation of immunity. See Littlejohn
& Kotch, Torts, 1977 Ann. Survey of Mich. Law, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 655, 657-
58 (1978). To date, only 14 states have a a state immunity doctrine. The states
which retain full immunity for states include: Arkansas, Maryland, South Dakota,
Virginia, and Wyoming. Georgia, Kansas, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and
Oklahoma allow a waiver in the case of insurance. Connecticut, Kentucky, Mich-
igan, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and West Virginia have
retained partial immunity.
126. 419 Mich. 202, 351 N.W.2d 810 (1984).
127. MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1405 (West 1968).
128. Id. § 250.61 (West 1967). This section provides that counties and cities
be divested of responsibility and liability for injuries resulting from trunk line
highway construction and maintenance. Id.
129. 419 Mich. 514, 358 N.W.2d 330 (1984).
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roads 30 allowed the joinder of a governmental agency as a third
party defendant under the contribution statute.' 3' The court held
that the third-party plaintiffs had a cause of action for contribution,
unfettered by governmental immunity. 32 The court then considered
whether the two year statute of limitations barred the claim.'
The contribution statute requires that a claim be filed "within 6
months after discharge by such party of the common liability or
payment of more than his pro rata share.' ' 3 4 Had the two year
statute of limitations period been applied, the contribution claim
would have been extinguished before it could accrue under the
contribution statute. The court rejected this statutory construction,
stating that "[w]e cannot suppose that the Legislature intended
such an absurd result.' 35
III. DEFAMATION
During the Survey period, the Michigan Supreme Court per-
petuated the confusing distinction in defamation cases between
exemplary and compensatory damages for injury to feelings. Peisner
v. Detroit Free Press, Inc.136 involved the interpretation of portions
of the Michigan statute governing damages in libel actions. 37 The
jury rendered a verdict of $52,000 against both the reporter, who
was responsible for the defamatory newspaper article, and the
Detroit Free Press. The jury also awarded additional damages of
$100,000 against the Free Press. Defendant attacked the award as
a double recovery, claiming that it guaranteed plaintiff recovery
for emotional injury under the statute governing actual damages
and under the statute governing exemplary and punitive damages. 38
130. MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 691.1402 (West 1968).
131. Id. § 600.2925 (West 1968).
132. 419 Mich. at 528-29, 358 N.W.2d at 336.
133. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1411(2) (West 1968).
134. Id. § 600.2925(4).
135. 419 Mich. at 538, 358 N.W.2d at 340 (footnote omitted).
136. 421 Mich. 125, 364 N.W.2d 600 (1984).
137. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2911 (West 1968). The statute provides
for the recovery of actual damages including damages for injury to feelings for
any statement proven to be defamatory. Id. § 600.2911(2)(c).
"Exemplary and punitive damages" have consistently been limited to damages
for injury to feelings and have not included punishment of defendant. Historically,
"exemplary" and "punitive" have been used interchangeably to mean damages
for the increased emotional injury presumed to flow from the ill will behind
the publication of a defamatory statement. 421 Mich. at 134-35, 364 N.W.2d
at 605. A clear explanation of this point can be found in Ross v. Leggett, 61
Mich. 445, 453, 28 N.W. 695, 698-99 (1886).
138. Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 104 Mich. App. 59, 304 N.W.2d
814 (1981), modified and aff'd, 421 Mich. 125, 364 N.W.2d 600 (1984).
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The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on
the damage issue. 3 9 The supreme court rejected the double recovery
characterization, but agreed that the case should be remanded for
a new trial, ruling that plaintiff would have to show "common
law malice" to sustain an award of exemplary and punitive damages
under the libel statute.14°
Thus, in Michigan, a plaintiff in a libel action may recover
two types of damages for injury to feelings. The first type is
compensatory damages based upon the actual injury to feelings.
The second type is exemplary and punitive damages associated
with the additional bad feelings resulting from defendant's ill will
in publishing the defamatory statement. The court explained that
this scheme is appropriate because defendant's "malicious motive"
increases the victim's outrage. 4' Thus, "[i]f a man employs spite
and venom in administering a physical hurt he must not expect
his maliciousness to escape consideration when he is cast to make
compensation for his wrong."' 42
Although faithful to the cannons of statutory construction,' 43
Peisner illustrates that even sound principles, when taken to extreme
lengths, may confound logic and yield impractical results. The
trial judge is expected to charge the jury in a manner that will
enable it to measure the injured feelings attributable solely to the
egregiousness of defendant's conduct.' Since the causal nexus is
unclear, and the jury is asked to award actual damages for an
injury to feelings, this task is difficult, if not impossible. Pre-
sumably, the actual damage award encompasses all of the hurt
feelings the plaintiff sustained. A better approach would be to
allow the jury to consider the ill will of defendant in evaluating
plaintiff's actual damages, thereby avoiding an unnecessarily con-
fusing jury instruction.
Various panels of the court. of appeals continued to draw lines
regarding the "public interest" qualified privilege. In Rouch v.
Enquirer & News,145 defendant published that plaintiff had been
arrested for the rape and assault of a seventeen year-old woman.
The article set forth the details of the alleged assault and falsely
139. 104 Mich. App. at 71, 304 N.W.2d at 819.
140. 421 Mich. at 142-43, 364 N.W.2d at 608-09.
141. Id. at 134, 364 N.W.2d at 605.
142. Id. (quoting Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W.2d 746 (1922)).
143. In support of its holding, the court noted that the libel statute has
been reenacted several times without substantial change. The court therefore
inferred that the legislature approved of the judicial interpretation of the statutory
language. 421 Mich. at 133, 364 N.W.2d at 604.
144. Id. at 135, 364 N.W.2d at 605.
145. 137 Mich. App. 39, 357 N.W.2d 794 (1984) (application for leave to
appeal pending).
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indicated that plaintiff had been charged with the offense. 146 The
court of appeals held that the defamatory statements were not
privileged, distinguishing matter that is interesting to the public
from that which is in the "public interest."'' 4 7 The court char-
acterized defendant's article as simply detailing "matters that the
public would find generally interesting and not matters 'deserving
of robust public debate."" '1 48 The court also suggested that the
press may avoid liability in negligence "by either reporting the
fact of an individual's arrest, without mentioning the details of
the crime ... or by reporting the details of the alleged crime
without naming the suspect until the matter has advanced to official
proceedings (and so avoiding even the possibility that the article
is libelous).' 1 49
A different court of appeals' panel appeared to reach a con-
flicting result in Dienes v. Associated Newspapers, Inc.150 Dienes
involved a television news report of an investigation that the Mich-
igan State Police and Michigan Humane Society conducted about
a starving herd of cows. Following an interview with plaintiff,
the reporter stated that "[t]hese cows are now getting a little bit
to eat but as you can see that has not always been the case." 5 '
It was later determined that the herd was not malnourished, but
had been diseased. 52
As in Rouch, the publication went beyond mere description
of governmental conduct to contain statements that expressly or
impliedly linked plaintiff to obviously odious conduct. The news-
caster could have limited his comments to the facts of the in-
vestigation without linking plaintiff personally to the alleged
wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the trial court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendant, emphasizing that
defendant had a reasonable basis for making the statements at
the time of the report. 5 3
146. Id. at 42-43, 357 N.W.2d at 796-97.
147. Id. at 58-59, 357 N.W.2d at 804.
148. Id. at 58, 357 N.W.2d at 804 (quoting Gaynes v. Allen, 128 Vlich.
App. 42, 339 N.W.2d 678 (1983)). Similarly, in Nabkey v. Booth Newspapers,
Inc., 140 Mich. App. 507, 364 N.W.2d 363 (1985) (application for leave to
appeal pending), a different panel of the court of appeals reversed the lower
court's grant of summary judgment to defendant, stating that the details of
plaintiff's arrest "merely provided interesting or amusing reading for the public."
Id. at 513, 364 N.W.2d at 366.
149. 137 Mich. App. at 59, 357 N.W.2d at 804-05.
150. 137 Mich. App. 272, 358 N.W.2d 562, leave to appeal denied, 419
Mich. 962 (1984).
151. Id. at 275, 358 N.W.2d at 564.
152. Id. at 281, 358 N.W.2d at 566.
153. Id. at 286, 358 N.W.2d at 569.
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IV. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Despite numerous appellate opinions in the medical malpractice
area during the Survey period, few were significant. The only
supreme court opinion established that the accrual provision for
medical malpractice actions'54 applies to an action against a hospital
for negligently provided medical services. 55
Two cases decided by the court of appeals are worthy of brief
comment. In Duvall v. Goldin 56 the court of appeals analyzed
the duty physicians owed to third parties. After an automobile
accident with one of defendant's patients, plaintiff sued, alleging
that defendant had a duty to properly diagnose and treat his
patient's epileptic condition, which included preventing his patient
from operating a motor vehicle. 57 The court of appeals agreed,' 8
stating that injury to third parties was a forseeable result of defend-
ant's failure to prevent his patient from driving. 59 Although the
court attempted to narrow its holding to the facts of the case,160
the facts necessary to invoke the duty should prove commonplace.
The decision merely requires proof of a medical condition which,
when negligently treated, poses a foreseeable risk of injury to a
third party. Duvall thus represents an important expansion of
medical malpractice liability.
In Lincoln v. Gupta,16' the trial court suppressed evidence
showing that defendant hospital negligently obtained decedent's
informed consent prior to a heart catheterization. The trial court
also charged the jury that only defendant physician had a duty
to inform the patient of risks associated with the surgery.' 62 The
court of appeals held that defendant hospital did not have a duty
to obtain decedent's informed consent and imposed this duty solely
on the physician. 163 The court reasoned that physicians are in the
154. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5838 (West Supp. 1985).
155. The accrual provision is a part of the revised judicature act and does
not define, by its express terms, malpractice. The court noted that the statute
"evidenced a legislative intent to alter the common law and subject other health
professionals to potential liability for malpractice." Adkins v. Annapolis Hosp.,
420 Mich. 87, 95, 360 N.W.2d 150, 154 (1984).
156. 139 Mich. App. 342, 362 N.W.2d 275 (1984) (application for leave
to appeal pending).
157. Id. at 345-46, 362 N.W.2d at 276.
158. Id. at 352, 362 N.W.2d at 279.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 139 Mich. App. 615, 370 N.W.2d 312 (1985).
162. Id. at 620-21, 370 N.W.2d at 315-16.
163. Id. at 625, 370 N.W.2d at 318.
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best position to discuss these matters with patients and to obtain
informed consent prior to treatment. 64
The court then rejected plaintiff's argument that the hospital
undertook the duty to inform the decedent by supplying the in-
formed consent form, concluding that since defendant physician
signed the form, any breach of duty was attributable to him. 65
This approach begs the question. By relying on the physician's
signature to exculpate the hospital, the court avoided answering
the question of whether the hospital had a duty to obtain plaintiff's
informed consent.
V. PREMISES LIABILITY
Several cases in the area of premises liability merit comment.
In Doran v. Combs166 plaintiff, defendant's former mother-in-law,
fell and broke her ankle while in defendant's driveway. At the
time of the accident, plaintiff was returning her grandchildren to
their mother after the children's weekend visitation with their father.
Plaintiff claimed that the trial judge should have instructed the
jury that she was an invitee as a matter of law, rather than
submitting the issue to the jury. The court of appeals agreed,
holding that plaintiff's presence on the "premises was mutually
beneficial and primarily a service to defendant, a service defendant
impliedly invited as it saved her a 24-mile round trip and a possible
altercation with her ex-husband."' 67
In Klimek v. Przewiecki, 68 the court found that a loose dog
was a "condition on the land" and held that the occupier of the
land owed a duty of reasonable care to prevent injury to a four
year-old licensee. 69 Klimek is the first Michigan case to impose
this duty on a mere licensee. 70 The case is also significant because
it reflects the modern trend of affording children enhanced pro-
tection by imposing a more onerous duty upon the occupiers of
land. ' 7 '
164. Id.
165. Id. at 626, 370 N.W.2d at 318.
166. 135 Mich. App. 492, 354 N.W.2d 804 (1984).
167. Id. at 497, 354 N.W.2d at 806.
168. 135 Mich. App. 115, 352 N.W.2d 361 (1984).
169. Id. at 119, 352 N.W.2d at 363.
170. See Scheibel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1976); Paquette v. Joyce,
117 N.H. 832 (1977); Quinlan v. Cecchini, 531 N.Y.2d 686 (1977); Hudson v.
Gestow, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn.1984).
171. The court stated in dictum that, "[t]hese authorities lead us to recognize
a duty on occupiers of land owed to a child social guest to exercise reasonable
or ordinary care to prevent injury to the child." 135 Mich. App. at 120, 352
N.W.2d at 364.
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In another case of first impression, Langen v. Rushton,'7 2
plaintiff motorcyclist collided with a vehicle exiting a parking area.
A tree located within a median strip owned by the shopping mall
obstructed the view of the roadway from the parking area. The
court of appeals found that the owner of a shopping center owed
a duty to motorists using highways adjacent to the shopping center
parking area, 73 citing the Restatement of Torts. 74 It is unclear
whether the court treated the tree and shopping center parking
lot as an artificial condition, a natural condition, or an entity
having characteristics of both.
Langen has increased significance when considered with the
burdens that the no-fault threshold of severe impairment imposes
upon plaintiffs. Langden, in a narrow segment of automobile
accident cases, apparently provides an avenue for negligence actions
that otherwise might not reach a jury.
The most novel case decided during the Survey period was
Sanford v. City of Detroit. 75 In that case, plaintiff alleged that
she was sexually assaulted in an abandoned building owned by
172. 138 Mich. App. 672, 360 N.W.2d 270 (1984).
173. Id. at 678, 360 N.W.2d at 273.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 363, 364, 368 (1977) provides:
§ 363. Natural Conditions
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), neither a possessor of land, nor a
vendor, lessor, or other transferor, is liable for physical harm caused to others
outside of the land by a natural condition of the land.
(2) A possessor of land in an urban area is subject to liability to persons
using a public highway for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm arising from the condition
of trees on the land near the highway.
§ 364. Creation of Maintenance of Dangerous Artificial Conditions
A possessor of land is subject to liability to others outside of the land for
physical harm caused by a structure or other artificial condition on the land,
which the possessor realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk
of such harm,
(a) the possessor has created the condition, or
(b) the condition is created by a third person with the possessor's consent
or acquiescence while the land is in his possession, or
(c) the condition is created by a third person without the possessor's consent
or acquiescence, but reasonable care is not taken to make the condition safe
after the possessor knows or should know of it.
§ 368. Conditions Dangerous to Travelers on Adjacent Highway
A possessor of land who creates or permits to remain thereon an excavation
or other artificial condition so near an existing highway that he realizes or should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to others accidentally brought into
contact with such condition while traveling with reasonable care upon the highway,
is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to persons who
(a) are traveling on the highway, or
(b) foreseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course of travel.
175. 143 Mich. App. 194, 371 N.W.2d 904.
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defendant. The court of appeals held that plaintiff sufficiently
plead a claim for intentional nuisance.176 As the dissent indicated,
this decision may result in an expansion of the common law duties
currently imposed upon private landowners. Notably, the court
did not characterize plaintiff's status as an invitee, licensee or
trespasser. Although premised upon an intentional nuisance theory,
Sanford may begin an evolution toward a general duty of reasonable
care. 117
The dissent recognized the possible impact of the decision on
the duties of owners and occupiers of land:
We should not inflate the nuisance exception to a pre-
viously inconceivable volume, nor should we overlook the
effect this holding will have on the potential liability of
private landowners. We should not forget that anything
said in a decision in a "nuisance" case with a governmental
defendant may, indeed will, be applied to non-governmental
defendants as well .... [heretofore] the duty to prevent
the harm [has hinged] upon the existence of a special re-
lationship between the land owner and the plaintiff, such
as a landlord/tenant or invitor/invitee relationship. 78
VI. DRAMSHOP
The Michigan Dramshop Act 79 (Act) provides an exclusive
remedy against licensed retailers who serve or furnish liquor to
visibly intoxicated persons. 80 The Act has been construed to provide
recovery in tort in a very narrow class of cases.'" Further, non-
innocent imbibers are precluded from availing themselves of the
remedies afforded under the Act. 8 2
176. Id. at 200, 371 N.W.2d at 907.
177. The intentional nuisance theory is a judically created doctrine that
allows a plaintiff to overcome statutory governmental immunity. See Rosario v.
Lansing, 403 Mich. 124, 131, 268 N.W.2d 230, 232 (1978).
178. 143 Mich. App. at 203, 371 N.W.2d at 908-09.
179. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985).
180. Moran v. McNew, 134 Mich. App. 764, 351 N.W.2d 881, leave to
appeal denied, 418 Mich. 905, 324 N.W.2d 521 (1984) (Dramshop Act provides
the exclusive remedy against sellers of alcohol for injuries caused by a minor
or intoxicated person who was unlawfully provided with alcohol).
181. See Manuel v. Weitzman, 386 Mich. 157, 191 N.W.2d 474 (1971);
Morris v. Markley, 143 Mich. App. 12, leave to appeal denied, 421 Mich. 864
(1985).
182. See McDaniel v. Crapo, 326 Mich. 555, 40 N.W.2d 724 (1950); Malone
v. Lambrecht, 305 Mich. 58, 8 N.W.2d 910 (1943); Gregory v. Curtis, 108 Mich.
App. 443, 310 N.W.2d 415 (1981).
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In light of increased public attention and lobbying efforts di-
rected to the Act, recent court of appeals decisions appear to have
expanded the exposure of dramshop defendants. For example, the
court of appeals has held that a dramshop may be sued in tort
under certain circumstances 8 3 and that dramshops may be liable
to the parents of a minor, even though the minor did not directly
purchase intoxicants from defendant. 84 In addition, Putney v.
Haskins'85 continues to provide tension, for several courts have
found exceptions to the requirement that the noninnocent imbiber
be "named and retained' ' 8 6 as a party defendant.
8 7
The most significant case decided by the court of appeals during
the Survey period was Morris v. Markley.'88 The court determined
that a dramshop defendant could be sued on the basis of gross
negligence when defendant had actual notice of plaintiff's helpless
condition.'8 9 In that case, the dramshop knew that plaintiff was
an alcoholic, yet deliberately served her intoxicating beverages to
enhance her performance as an exotic dancer. Plaintiff was sub-
sequently injured in an automobile accident.
The court acknowledged a split of authority regarding a claim
for gross negligence and willful and wanton misconduct against
a dramshop defendant, but found that plaintiff could sue in tort."g
In finding a basis for tort liability, the court relied on Grasser
v. Fleming'91 for the proposition that there are certain circumstances
that provide an exception to the Act's exclusivity. 92 In Morris,
defendant's reckless disregard of plaintiff's welfare was a sufficient
circumstance.
This exception to the general prohibition of the Dramshop Act
is apparently limited to cases in which the facts establish "both
gross negligence and actual notice of plaintiff's condition that
183. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
184. See infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
185. 414 Mich. 181, 324 N.W.2d 729 (1982).
186. MICH. ComP. LAWs ANN. § 436.22(5) (West 1978 & Supp. 1985).
187. Putney is based upon the failure to "name and retain." Despite
substantial settlement with the intoxicated defendant, the injured party can bring
no action against the dramshop if the intoxicated person is no longer a party
to the suit. 414 Mich. at 184, 324 N.W.2d at 729.
188. 143 Mich. App. 12, 371 N.W.2d 464 (1985).
189. Id. at 15, 371 N.W.2d at 466. Morris reversed a summary judgment
for the plaintiff. Id.
190. Id.
191. 74 Mich. App. 338, 253 N.W.2d 757 (1977).
192. Morris cites Grasser for the exception to the exclusivity of the Dram-
shop Act when defendant's culpability is unrelated to the sale of alcohol. Grasser
involved liability for the negligent maintenance of business premises. 74 Mich.
App. at 345-46, 253 N.W.2d at 760-61.
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would make the serving of alcohol willful, wanton and intentional
and a reckless disregard of plaintiff's helpless condition .. .
Thus, Morris expands the tort liability of dramshop defendants.'94
The aftermath of Putney continues to be problematic. Putney
established that the intoxicated person must be named and retained
as party to the dramshop action until the litigation is concluded. 95
Thus, even where defendant imbibers settle within the insurance
policy limits, Putney requires their retention. The basis for this
requirement is the avoidance of collusion between imbibers and
plaintiffs. Ironically, Putney has fostered this type of collusion.
The insurance carrier for a culpable imbiber typically attempts to
limit exposure to the policy limits or below by providing at min-
imum a very cooperative witness or becoming a partner at trial.
Several recent opinions have dispensed with or lessened the
impact of the name and retain requirement. In Brannstrom v.
Tippman, 96 the court of appeals held that retention of the imbibing
defendant driver in a separate wrongful death action was sufficient
to satisfy the requirement. 97 In Newman v. Hoholhick, 98 the court
of appeals found that the requirement was satisfied when the
imbiber was the father of the plaintiff. 99 Relying on Salas v.
Clements,200 the court reasoned that requiring retention of the
plaintiff's father would be unreasonable and inconsistent with the
purpose of the "name and retain" provision.20 1 According to the
court, Putney need not be strictly adhered to because Putney did
not expressly or impliedly overrule cases that create exceptions to
the "name and retain" requirement. 20 2
Brannstrom and Newman demonstrate the lack of strict ad-
herence to Putney. In Newman for example, strict adherence to
Putney would have extinguished the dramshop claim since defend-
ant driver could not have been retained in the suit because of
193. 143 Mich. App. at 15, 371 N.W.2d at 466.
194. See Manuel, 386 Mich. 157, 191 N.W.2d 474. Prior to Morris, failure
to maintain safe premises was the only negligence claim available against a
dramshop defendant.
195. See supra note 184.
196. 141 Mich. App. 664, 367 N.W.2d 902, leave to appeal denied, 422
Mich. 976 (1985).
197. Id. at 672, 367 N.W.2d at 906.
198. 138 Mich. App. 66, 359 N.W.2d 253 (1984).
199. Id. at 72, 359 N.W.2d at 256.
200. 399 Mich. 103, 247 N.W.2d 889 (1984). Salas held that it was necessary
to "name and retain" the intoxicated defendant who had assaulted plaintiff where
plaintiff did not know defendant's identity. Id. at 110, 247 N.W.2d at 892.
201. 138 Mich. App. at 70, 359 N.W.2d at 255 (quoting Salas, 399 Mich.
at 109, 247 N.W.2d at 889).
202. 138 Mich. App. at 70, 359 N.W.2d at 255-56.
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family immunity. It is doubtful that the legislature intended that
a culpable dramshop avoid liability on the basis of the noninnocent
imbiber's familial connection to the injured plaintiffs.
In Verdusco v. Miller,20 3 the court of appeals affirmed an award
of damages to the parents of a minor who had consumed alcoholic
beverages purchased from defendant. The distinguishing factor in
Verdusco was that plaintiff's son did not purchase the beverages
directly from defendant. Dramshop defendant sold intoxicants to
another minor who provided the beverage to plaintiff's son. The
trial court found that the dramshop defendant knew or should
have known that the liquor would eventually reach other minors.
Thus, it denied defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
court of appeals affirmed the result. 204
Since the statutory language speaks only to direct sales to
minors,205 Verdusco provides a judicial gloss extending beyond the
express terms of the statute. Nevertheless, depending upon the
specific facts in support of the agency theory, such expansion is
well-premised. It would be anomalous to allow a dramshop defend-
ant to assert lack of a sale to a minor as a complete defense
when it knew of the agency relationship.
In contrast to those pronouncements expanding dramshop li-
ability, several recent decisions provide some limitations. In Klotz
v. Persenaire,206 the court held that the parents of an intoxicated
minor could not maintain an action for wrongful death against
a social host who provided alcohol to the minor. The minor drowned
in a boating accident involving defendant's boat. The court of
appeals held that the legislative policy implicit in the Act, which
favors precluding suit by noninnocent imbibers, also applied to
actions against social hosts. Therefore, since the minor would be
unable to recover had he survived, his parents were also precluded
from recovering against the host.20 7
Klotz is analytically faulty and unjust. The purpose of the Act
is to create a cause of action for innocent third parties; such
actions are regularly maintained. Klotz imposes the burden of the
dramshop bar without the benefits of the Dramshop Act. Under
203. 138 Mich. App. 702, 360 N.W.2d 281 (1984), leave to appeal denied,
424 Mich. 863 (1985).
204. The Verdusco court relied on language in Meyer v. State Line Super
Market, 1 Mich. App. 562, 569, 137 N.W.2d 299, 302 (1965) (agency relationship
between a minor who buys alcohol and his friends could be known to a defendant).
205. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 436.22(3) (West 1978 & Supp. 1985).
206. 138 Mich. App. 638, 360 N.W.2d 255 (1984) (application for leave
to appeal pending).
207. Id. at 641-42, 360 N.W.2d at 287.
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Klotz, parents of the noninnocent imbiber can sue when a social
host violates prohibitions against liquor sales to minors resulting
in personal injury. However, parents are barred when the violation
results in the death of the minor. The court's preclusion of plain-
tiffs' claim directly contradicts a prior court of appeals' decision
20 1
and arguably fails to properly construe the statutory prohibition
against sales of alcohol to minors in accordance with its underlying
legislative intent. This prohibition is intended to embody and extend
common law traditions of protecting minors. The preclusion of
a civil action for violation of this prohibition conflicts with its
underlying legislative intent because it punishes minors and protects
the individuals who corrupt them.
Klotz effectively destroys any cause of action for minors or
their families when injuries not resulting in death occur as a result
of the unlawful serving of alcohol to a minor by a social host.
This result was tempered because the court allowed plaintiff to
proceed on the theory that defendant negligently permitted plain-
tiffs' decedent to operate a powerboat while intoxicated. That
portion of the court's holding, however, does not mitigate the
impact of the decision on future cases involving a violation of
liquor sales laws. Moreover, Klotz conflicts with both Michigan
precedent and precedent from other jurisdictions.2°9
Lyman v. Bavar 210 applied comparative negligence to a dram-
shop action, precluding recovery where plaintiff's negligence was
unrelated to the prohibited acts associated with the sale and pur-
chase of intoxicants. Dahn v. Sheets,21' however, appears to provide
an analysis contrary to Lyman. In Dahn, the court reasoned that
comparative negligence only applied to claims based on negli-
gence.2 2 This approach to the comparative negligence issue would
preclude the result reached in Lyman.
208. Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 125 Mich. App. 261, 375 N.W.2d 677 (1982),
leave to appeal granted, 418 Mich. 876 (1983).
209. Other jurisdictions have held social hosts subject to liability when
serving liquor to minors or visibly intoxicated persons. See Ashlock v. Norris,
475 N.E.2d 1167 (Ind. App. 1985); Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d
716 (1985); Kelly v. Gwinell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); Congini v.
Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983).
210. 136 Mich. App. 407, 356 N.W.2d 28 (1984).
211. 104 Mich. App. 584, 305 N.W.2d 547 (1981). Lyman distinguished
Dahn on the grounds that it involved a plaintiff who was not subject to an
offset for his negligence in being personally intoxicated. In Lyman, the court
noted that plaintiff was injured by his own negligence that was not related to
the intoxication of those who injured him during a fight at the bar. 136 Mich.
App. at 410, 356 N.W.2d at 30.
212. 104 Mich. App. at 593, 305 N.W.2d at 551.
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VII. No-FAULT
The Michigan No-Fault Act213 supplanted traditional tort rem-
edies for automobile accidents by providing a statutory benefit
scheme. Under the statute, an injured person may recover specified
benefits regardless of the cause of the accident. Civil damages may
be recovered where a person sustains severe personal injuries. 21 4
In Cassidy v. McGovern,215 the supreme court sought to provide
uniform interpretation in serious impairment cases. Nevertheless,
various panels of the court of appeals continue to wrestle with
this threshold requirement for recovery in tort. Exemplary of this
confusion is Argenta v. Shahan.2 6 That court stated that refereace
to alternative thresholds of tort liability-death and permalient
serious disfigurement-are irrelevant and a source of confusion. 21 7
The court held that objective thermographic test results, dem-
onstrating muscle tears and scar tissue and the resultant limitation
of plaintiff's ability to move his back, satisfied the severe im-
pairment threshold as a matter of law. 218 Therefore, the court of
appeals affirmed the denial of defendant's motion for directed
verdict, even though plaintiff was not hospitalized overnight and
continued to work.21 9
In contrast, the court of appeals found no serious impairment
of bodily function in Vreeland v. Wayman, 2 0 and Flemings v.
Jenkins.221 These cases involved soft tissue injuries. Vreeland held
213. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.3101-.3179 (West 1983).
214. The statute provides that "[a] person remains subject to tort liability
for non-economic loss caused by his or her ownership, maintenance, or use of
a motor vehicle only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment
of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement." Id. § 500.3135(1).
215. 415 Mich. 483, 330 N.W.2d 22 (1982). The Cassidy court composed
guidelines for the determination of serious impairment of bodily function:
1) The term serious impairment must be considered in conjunction
with the other two threshold requirements, death and permanent serious
disfigurement.
2) The impairment must be of important body functions.
3) The court will look to a person's general ability to lead a normal
life and not to that person's specific lifestyle to determine serious im-
pairment.
4) The injuries must be objectively manifested.
5) While permanency is relevant, it is not conclusive.
Id. at 503-05, 330 N.W.2d at 30.
216. 135 Mich. App. 477, 354 N.W.2d 796, leave to appeal granted, 421
Mich. 858 (1985).
217. Id. at 482, 354 N.W.2d at 799.
218. Id. at 486-89, 354 N.W.2d at 801-02.
219. Id. at 489, 354 N.W.2d at 802.
220. 141 Mich. App. 574, 367 N.W.2d 362 (1985).
221. 138 Mich. App. 788, 360 N.W.2d 298 (1984).
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that the threshold of serious impairment had not been satisfied
because the injuries were not subject to medical measurement and
permitted plaintiff to continue to lead a normal life. 222 Similarly,
Flemings found that lumbar pain and limited back flexion did not
constitute serious impairment. 223 Flemings involved some objective
manifestation of injury, namely the testimony of a treating phy-
sician as to plaintiff's back spasms. Despite such evidence and a
therapy treatment that extended for more than one year, the court
held that serious impairment had not occurred because no ob-
jectively manifested injury existed and plaintiff's lifestyle did not
change much. 224
Argenta, Vreeland, and Flemings illustrate the conflict in the
court of appeals over soft tissue injuries. 225 The cases can be
reconciled on the basis that Argenta included "objective" medical
test results. Unfortunately, that explanation is inadequate since the
injuries in Flemings were objectively manifested by back spasms. 226
Moreover, Cassidy merely required some objective manifestation
of injury. 227 Should the court of appeals continue to follow the
Flemings' treatment of "objective manifestation," absent the ad-
missibility of the thermographic test results, recovery in soft tissue
injury cases will be difficult. 228
Another split of authority in serious impairment cases involves
recovery for loss of earning capacity. 229 In MacDonald v. State
222. 141 Mich. App. at 576-77, 367 N.W.2d at 363.
223. 138 Mich. App. at 790, 360 N.W.2d at 299.
224. Id.
225. Michigan Court of Appeals cases have shown varying degrees of injuries
sufficient to constitute severe impairment. See Range v. Gorosh, 140 Mich. App.
712, 364 N.W.2d 686 (1985) (six broken ribs, a broken clavicle, a broken toe,
continued difficulty in breathing, and a four day hospital stay met the threshold
of serious bodily impairment); Sherrell v. Bugaski, 140 Mich. App. 708, 364
N.W.2d 684 (1985) (permanent back injury that prohibited plaintiff from setting
for long periods or from jogging was not a serious impairment when plaintiff
could otherwise lead a normal life); Burke v. Warren, 137 Mich. App. 715, 359
N.W.2d 541 (1984) (fractured clavicle resulting in temporary immobility of one arm
was not a serious impairment of a bodily function), leave to appeal granted, 422
Mich. 935 (1985).
226. 138 Mich. App. at 789, 360 N.W.2d at 299.
227. 415 Mich. at 505, 330 N.W.2d at 30.
228. Michigan, unlike other jurisdictions with a specific statute, leaves the
determination of serious bodily impairment as a factual one. For a survey of
statutes in other jurisdictions, see Obee, Torts, 1983 Ann. Survey of Mich. Law,
30 WAYNE L. REV. 803, 834-36 nn.160-61 (1984).
229. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3135(2)(c) (West 1983) provides for
recovery of "[d]amages for allowable expenses, work loss, and survivor's loss
as defined in sections 3107 to 3110 ...... Section 3107(b) states that "[p]ersonal
protection benefits are payable for . . .work loss consisting of loss of income
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Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 20 the supreme court denied "work
loss" benefits to a plaintiff who suffered a heart attack two weeks
after the accident giving rise to his no-fault claim. 23' The court
held that plaintiff could not recover because he would not have
earned wages during the two week period even if the accident had
not occurred.22 This result precludes consideration of lost earning
capacity because the magnitude of plaintiff's lost earning capacity
sustained at the time of the accident would have been the measure
of the benefits payable to him.
The court in Ouellette v. Kenealy,211 relying on MacDonald,
held that damages for work loss under the tort liability section
are defined by the sections covering work loss and that work loss
within those sections excludes loss of earning capacity.2 4 Therefore,
the court concluded that the tort liability section excludes loss of
earning capacity. 25 Ouellette expressly rejected the contrary rea-
soning in Argenta in reaching this conclusion. After discussing
serious impairment of bodily function, the Argenta court held that
a plaintiff could bring a tort action for loss of earning capacity. 23 6
The Oullette court concluded that the statutory language governing
the payment of personal protection benefits limited tort recovery. 237
The split between Argenta and Oulette is based on the express
language of section 3135, which arguably incorporates the definition
of work loss found in section 3107(b). This issue is further com-
plicated by supreme court statements in Cassidy indicating that
economic loss greater than the statutory scheme was recoverable
by means of a tort action. 238 Cassidy reasoned that the purpose
of the No-Fault Act was to provide the catastrophically injured
victim and the victim of extraordinary economic losses with com-
pensation beyond that provided in the No-Fault Act. 239
Michigan courts also decided two cases concerning recovery
from work an injured person would have performed during the first 3 years
after the date of the accident if he had not been injured .... ." Id. § 500.3107(b).
230. 419 Mich. 146, 350 N.W.2d 233 (1984).
231. Id. at 154, 350 N.W.2d at 236.
232. Id. at 151-52, 350 N.W.2d at 235-36.
233. 141 Mich. App. 562, 367 N.W.2d 353 (1985).
234. Id. at 564, 367 N.W.2d at 355.
235. Id.
236. 135 Mich. App. at 485, 354 N.W.2d at 801.
237. Id. at 564, 367 N.W.2d at 355. The Oullette court cited MacDonald.
MacDonald was not a serious impairment case, however.
238. The court in Cassidy stated that "for economic losses beyond those
for which payment was assured, the traditional tort remedy was left intact."
415 Mich. at 499, 330 N.W.2d at 28.
239. Id.
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by garage owners under the no-fault system. In Michigan Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Carson City Texaco, Inc.,240 plaintiffs's garage
was damaged when defendant's truck exploded while plaintiff was
serving it. The supreme court required the vehicle owner's insurance
carrier to pay for the damages, despite the possibility of con-
tributory negligence. 24' Chief Justice Williams concurred, stating
that statutory construction compelled this result, even if it was
against public policy.
242
In Coleman v. Franzon,243 plaintiff was injured as a result of
defendant's negligent repairs on her vehicle. Relying on Citizens
Insurance Co. v. Tuttle,244 the court of appeals held that the no-
fault scheme only applied to accidents caused by motor vehicles.
Thus, nonmotorist tortfeasors remain liable in tort.245
VIII. INTENTIONAL TORTS
Significant developments in the area of intentional torts concern
battery and intentional interference with business relations. In Over-
all v. Kadella,246 the court of appeals affirmed a verdict for plaintiff
hockey player who was injured in a melee immediately following
a hockey game. The court reasoned that plaintiff's consent to
physical contact during the game did not extend to contact after
the game.2 47 The court also reasoned that the conduct complained
of constituted a violation of the safety rules of the game.24 This
result is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions. 24 9
240. 421 Mich. 144, 365 N.W.2d 89 (1984).
241. Id. at 149, 365 N.W.2d at 91.
242. Id. at 149, 365 N.W.2d at 92.
243. 141 Mich. App. 99, 366 N.W.2d 86 (1985).
244. 411 Mich. 536, 309 N.W.2d 174 (1981).
245. 141 Mich. App. at 102, 366 N.W.2d at 87.
246. 138 Mich. App. 342, 361 N.W.2d 352 (1984).
247. Id. at 358, 361 N.W.2d at 356.
248. Id. at 357-58, 361 N.W.2d at 355 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 50 comment b (1965)) (participation in a game does not manifest consent
to contacts which are prohibited by rules or usages of the game if such rules
or usages are designed to protect the participants of the game and not merely
to secure the better playing of the game as a test of skill).
249. See Nabozny v. Barnhill, 31 111. App. 3d 212, 334 N.E.2d 258 (1975)
(teenage member of soccer team kicked goalie in head while goalie had possession
of ball in penalty area where contact with goalie is prohibited); Griggas v. Clauson,
6 Il1. App. 2d 412, 128 N.E.2d 363 (1955) (defendant intentionally struck plaintiff
during a basketball game without provocation); Bourque v. DuPlechin, 331 So.
2d 40 (La. App.) (defendant ran out of the base path in a softball game and
intentionally collided with the second baseman), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 210
(La. 1976).
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The court of appeals continues to grapple with the issue of
intentional interference with business relations. In Trepel v. Pontiac
Osteopathic Hospital,250 the court of appeals affirmed the judgment
in favor of plaintiffs, but found that the trial court incorrectly
stated the elements of intentional interference with business re-
lations. 25 The trial court cited Northern Plumbing & Heating, Inc.
v. Henderson Bros. Inc. 252 and its progeny2 3 as authority for the
four basic elements of tortious interference with business relations.
These elements include the presence of a valid business relationship
or expectancy, knowledge of the business relationship or expectancy
by the interferer, an intentional interference that induces or causes
a breach or termination of the business relationship or expectancy,
and the resulting damage to the party whose business relationship
or expectancy is disrupted. 254
The court of appeals, however, cited authorities that require
a showing of improper conduct to establish intentional interference
with business relations. 255 The Trepel court and the court of appeals
in Feldman v. Green256 required that the Meyering definition of
intentional interference with business relations be employed.257 If
Trepel is followed, intentional interference with business relations
and intentional interference with contractual relations will be nearly
identical, despite the Trepel court's statement that the definition
250. 135 Mich. App. 361, 354 N.W.2d 341 (1984).
251. Id. at 375-76, 354 N.W.2d at 347.
252. 83 Mich. App. 84, 268 N.W.2d 296 (1978).
253. See, e.g., Derosia v. Austin, 115 Mich. App. 647, 321 N.W.2d 760
(1982); Wilkerson v. Carlo, 101 Mich. App. 629, 300 N.W.2d 658 (1980).
254. See supra notes 245-46.
255. 135 Mich. App. at 377, 354 N.W.2d at 347. The court cited Meyering
v. Russell, 53 Mich. App. 695, 220 N.W.2d 121 (adopting the concurrence of
O'Hara, J.), rev'd on other grounds, 393 Mich. 770 (1974). See also, Weitting
v. McFetters, 104 Mich. App. 188, 197, 304 N.W.2d 525, 529 (1981).
The court also cited the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979)
which states:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's pro-
spective contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to
liability to the other for the pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the
benefits of the relation, whether the interference consists of:
a) inducing or otherwise causing a third person not to enter into or continue
the prospective relation or
b) preventing the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.
256. 138 Mich. App. 360, 377, 360 N.W.2d 881, 890 (1984). Feldman
involved the same issues as Trepel. After a lengthy discussion of Michigan case
law, the Feldman court failed to recognize the conflict. For that reason, Trepel
is used to illustrate the issue. Feldman also implied that an option contract was
not sufficient to plead intentional interference with contractual relations.
257. 135 Mich. App. at 377, 354 N.W.2d at 347.
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of improper may differ in degree when an actual contract is in-
volved.21
Two court of appeals decisions, both involving insurance con-
tracts, precluded the recovery of damages for emotional distress.
25 9
The decisions in these cases are not surprising since the supreme
court in Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.260
precluded recovery for emotional distress in breach of insurance
contract cases and has recently reiterated this holding. 26 I Although
Kewin allowed some recovery for emotional distress in contract
cases where the contracts were "matters of personality, ' 262 neither
Harris nor Hajciar fit this exception.
However, in Roberts v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co.263 the court
of appeals affirmed a jury verdict for plaintiff based on intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The court found that the insurer's
failure to supply forms, as well as the severe nature of plaintiff's
injuries and defendant's efforts "to frustrate plaintiffs from ap-
plying for benefits and then punishing them by failing to cooperate
when they obtained counsel, could reasonably be considered ex-
treme and outrageous.
'
"
264
Roberts was the only case during the Survey period in which
the court of appeals found defendant's conduct extreme and out-
rageous. In Hall v. Citizens Insurance Co., 265 the court found that
the commencement of a subrogation lawsuit and the garnishment
of a paycheck in a case of mistaken identity was not sufficiently
258. "The social desirability of encouraging competition will justify some
actions in an advantageous business relationship case which would be tortious
if a contract existed." Id. at 375, 354 N.W.2d at 346-47 (quoting Northern
Plumbing & Heating v. Henderson Bros., Inc., 83 Mich. App. 84, 100, 268
N.W.2d 296, 302 (1978)).
259. Hajciar v. Crawford & Co., 142 Mich. App. 632, 369 N.W.2d 860
(1985) (trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendant affirmed although
the decedent's death allegedly occurred as a result of depression and despondency
caused by defendant/insurer's termination of workers' compensation benefits
without cause); Harris v. Citizen's Ins. Co., 141 Mich. App. 110, 366 N.W.2d
11 (1983) (claims representative's attempt to deceive plaintiff into admitting that
he had gainful employment during the period for which he claimed disability
was not actionable).
260. 409 Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980).
261. See Valentine v. General Am. Credit, Inc., 420 Mich. 256, 362 N.W.2d
628 (1984).
262. 409 Mich. at 416, 295 N.W.2d at 53.
263. 135 Mich. App. 595, 354 N.W.2d 271 (1983). This case was not
discussed in last year's Survey.
264. Id. at 600, 354 N.W.2d at 273. The tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires that plaintiff show that defendant's conduct was
extreme and outrageous. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
265. 141 Mich. App. 676, 368 N.W.2d 250 (1985).
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outrageous to warrant recovery for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. 266 The court apparently believed that being wrong-
fully subjected to a law suit and the consequent embarrassment
and humiliation associated with garnishment was ordinary.
IX. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
In Sweetman v. State Highway Depatment,267 the court of
appeals discussed the relationship of comparative negligence to the
"rescue doctrine," holding that the rescue doctrine allowed a
defendant to assert comparative negligence of the rescuer as a
defense. Plaintiff witnessed a motor vehicle accident, apparently
caused by slippery road conditions on a freeway overpass. The
victim's vehicle slid into a guardrail, prompting plaintiff to stop
her vehicle to render aid. After determining that the victim was
not seriously injured, plaintiff positioned herself near the roadway
and attempted to warn approaching traffic. A moving vehicle struck
plaintiff, resulting in the traumatic amputation of one leg and the
surgical amputation of the other. The trial court found that the
highway department failed to adequately warn of the potential
hazard. Nevertheless, plaintiff's verdict was reduced by an amount
equivalent to the trial court's finding of seventy-five percent com-
parative negligence. 268 The trial court found that plaintiff had been
injured while acting beyond the scope of her rescue mission.269
The court of appeals disagreed on the comparative negligence issue.
That court held that because plaintiff was engaged in the course
of the rescue and acted under the reasonable belief that the victim's
peril continued, her contributory negligence, if any, had to be
reassessed. 270
The court of appeals' exclusive focus upon the peril of the
individual victim is troublesome. Plaintiff's attempt to warn other
motor vehicle drivers could be construed as an attempt to rescue
them from danger. Consideration of plaintiff's reasonable belief
as to peril posed by the hazardous road conditions should be
extended beyond the individual who has already sustained an ac-
cident and injury. To hold otherwise may place undue emphasis
upon acts done subsequent to injury and minimize rescue acts to
prevent further accidents and injuries.
266. Id. at 684, 368 N.W.2d at 254.
267. 137 Mich. App. 14, 355 N.W.2d 783 (1984).
268. Id. at 18-20, 355 N.W.2d at 786.
269. Id. at 27, 355 N.W.2d at 789.
270. Id. at 28, 355 N.W.2d at 790.
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